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Abstract
The new mechanism defined under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement is supposed to allow for international 
cooperation with regard to climate change mitigation and thereby enable an increase in overall mitigation. 
Nevertheless, the design of the mechanism under Article 6.4 should also make sure that it is not be in conflict 
with the long-term goal of net-zero GHG emissions but even better foster national pathways leading to this 
objective. Building this into the mechanism requires to shift the focus from short- and mid-term considerations 
to the long-term perspective in one way or another. 
This discussion paper explores three different approaches that may help to foster the long-term objective of 
net-zero GHG emissions in the operationalization of Article 6.4, namely positive and negative lists, additionality 
with regard to a baseline consistent with both, NDCs and long-term targets, as well as adaptation of existing 
instruments and criteria from climate finance. The detailed discussion of the ap-proaches shows that the 
approaches should not be seen as mutually exclusive but rather as comple-mentary to each other. From the 
analyses, two storylines emerge how to combine aspects of the differ-ent approaches in a reasonable way to 
foster the long-term objective of net-zero GHG emissions under Article 6.4.
Kurzbeschreibung
Der in Artikel 6.4 des Paris-Abkommens (PA) definierte neue Mechanismus soll eine internationale Zusammen-
arbeit bei der Eindämmung des Klimawandels ermöglichen und damit einen Beitrag zur Gesamtminderung 
erbringen. Nichtsdestotrotz sollte die Ausgestaltung des Mechanismus nach Artikel 6.4 ebenfalls sicherstellen, 
dass die Aktivitäten nicht im Widerspruch zum langfristigen Ziel von netto-null THG-Emissionen stehen, 
sondern nationale Strategien, die zu diesem Ziel führen, noch untermau-ern. Um diese Aspekte in den  
Mechanismus zu integrieren, muss der Fokus auf die ein oder andere Wei-se von kurz- und mittelfristigen 
Maßnahmen auf die langfristige Entwicklung verlegt werden.
In diesem Diskussionspapier werden drei Ansätze untersucht, die dazu beitragen können, das langfristige Ziel 
von netto-null THG-Emissionen bei der Operationalisierung von Artikel 6.4 zu erreichen, näm-lich Positiv- und 
Negativlisten, die Zusätzlichkeit in Bezug auf eine Baseline, die sowohl mit den NDCs auch mit den langfristigen 
Zielen vereinbar ist, sowie die Übernahme bestehender Instrumente und Kriterien aus der Klimafinanzierung. 
Die ausführliche Diskussion der verschiedenen Ansätze zeigt, dass die Ansätze nicht als sich gegenseitig 
ausschließend, sondern als komplementär anzusehen sind. Aus den Analysen geht hervor, wie in zwei Hand-
lungssträngen Aspekte der verschiedenen Ansätze auf sinnvolle Weise kombiniert werden können, um das lang-
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Summary
The objectives of the Paris Agreement (PA) in its Article 4 require a global balance of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and sinks in the second half of the 21st century in order to limit temperature increase well-below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels. The parties of the PA are required to define and implement ambitious short- and 
long-term climate change mitigation measures that contribute to achieve this objective. The new mechanism 
defined under Article 6.4 of the PA is supposed to allow for international cooperation with regard to climate 
change mitigation and thereby enable an increase in overall mitigation. This means that all mitigation activities 
eligible under Article 6.4 need to demonstrate additionality with regard to the Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (NDCs) of the countries involved, which is challenging given the requirement to continuously increase the 
ambition of NDCs. Nevertheless, the design of the mechanism under Article 6.4 should also make sure that it is 
in line with other objectives of the PA. In particular, the activities under Article 6.4 should at least not be in 
conflict with the long-term goal of net-zero GHG emissions but even better foster national pathways leading  
to this objective. Building this into the mechanism requires to shift the focus from short- and mid-term  
considerations to the long-term perspective in one way or another. Setting the focus on long-term emission 
reduction strategies is necessary, in particular, for avoiding technological lock-ins that would hinder a full 
decarbonisation in the long run.
This discussion paper explores three different approaches that may help to foster the long-term objective of 
net-zero GHG emissions in the operationalization of Article 6.4, namely:
▸	 Positive and negative lists: Positive and negative lists may be a simple tool to, on the one hand, enable 
easier eligibility of certain activity types known to be compatible, and, on the one hand, classify certain 
activity types that are very likely to be incompatible with the long-term objective as ineligible. Nevertheless, 
there remain certain activity types, for which a more detailed consideration is necessary. Therefore,  
a three-tiered approach reflecting these three groups of activity types has been identified to be most 
 compelling here. This approach mirrors similar approaches applied to the alignment of investments  
with the objectives of the PA, classifying them as Paris-aligned, misaligned or conditional.
▸	 Additionality with regard to a baseline consistent with both, NDCs and long-term targets: The use  
of baselines to demonstrate additionality with regard to NDCs will only foster net-zero emissions in case  
of an ambitious NDC and even then may partially entail lock-in of GHG emissions the long-term perspective. 
To tackle the net-zero objective, the baselines need to incorporate long-term targets as well. This long-term 
perspective can be based on a detailed national pathway to net-zero emissions or on science-based targets 
independent of the detailed situation in the country. As both approaches have advantages and disadvan-
tages, it seems most promising to combine them in a way such that science-based targets guarantee the 
required level of ambition, while compatibility with the country’s long-term low emissions development 
strategy is also ensured.
▸	 Adaptation of existing instruments and criteria from climate finance: The net-zero objective is also 
relevant for some existing funding instruments linked to climate finance. The Innovation Fund (IF) of the 
European Union (EU) focuses on support for technologies that are needed for net-zero emissions but are 
often not part of mitigation pathways due to being highly innovative. Moreover, the EU classification system 
for environmentally sustainable economic activities (“EU Taxonomy”) defines threshold criteria with regard 
to sustainability for a broad set of technology fields. Some further instruments apply the concept of transfor-
mational change to address the long-term perspective of the funded programs. While the concept of transfor-
mational change has some links to the use of baselines and positive lists, it adds some softer criteria about 
the long-term impact, in particular about the avoidance of discontinuation due to finance and/or acceptance 
issues. 
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The detailed discussion of the approaches shows that they should not be seen as mutually exclusive but rather 
as complementary to each other. In addition, although the approaches are at least partially addressing additio-
nality as well, they cannot be a full replacement for checking additionality. Working with baselines instead of 
positive/ negative lists has the benefit that there is no need to explicitly “pick technologies”. On the other hand, 
developing baselines in line with long-term zero emissions may be cumbersome, if no science-based target 
approach is used. From the analyses in this report, two story-lines emerge how to combine aspects of the 
different approaches in a reasonable way to foster the long-term objective of net-zero GHG emissions under 
Article 6.4:
▸	 If politically feasible, the most straight-forward approach would be to use the three-tiered approach corres-
ponding to negative and positive lists in the first step. This means to sort out certain activity types in the 
beginning by establishing positive and negative lists, while the eligibility of activity types that are neither  
on the positive list nor on the negative list will be conditional to the application of further criteria. In the 
next step, the remaining activity types would be assessed based on comparison with a baseline that should 
demonstrate both additionality and compatibility with a long-term mitigation pathway in line with the 
net-zero objective. In a third step, buyers with particular high standards could in addition apply further 
relevant criteria for transformational change, thereby reducing the risk of discontinuation and supporting  
a sustainable transition of the host country. 
▸	 However, positive and negative lists will face high political barriers and are also in danger of experiencing 
strong influence from lobbying organisations. Therefore, such kind of lists are more likely to be established 
as buying criteria by individual buyers. In this case, they would be still complementary to the other approa-
ches but the ordering would be changed. In this case, the starting point would be the inclusion of baselines 
compatible with the long-term targets in the proof of additionality, thereby excluding activities with only 
short-term effects in addition to NDCs and/or activities becoming the reference case in the longer term. 
Nevertheless, some of the remaining eligible activities may still be seen to be not in line with the long-term 
objective or contradict the requirements of transformation change. Then, individual buyers could classify 
these based on positive and negative list, but also apply additional criteria for policy and financial  
sustainability to foster a transformational change.
▸	 Looking ahead, it will probably be rather difficult to establish mechanisms that foster the long-term objective 
of net-zero GHG emissions in the operationalisation of Article 6.4, at least in the short term because the 
Article 6 negotiations are currently highly contentious even without consideration of the long-term aspects 
discussed here. Nevertheless, there is the need to at least have a clear roadmap of how to achieve compli-
ance of the mechanism with the net-zero objective in the longer term. The options discussed here provide 
some potential avenues. Given the unclear political feasibility of each of the approaches, it seems important 
not to stick to one approach only, but to be flexible in establishing any of it, whenever a window of oppor-
tunity turns up. In this context, an implementation under a club approach by a group of countries seems 
more feasible as the first step for now, while recognizing that robust rules to assure environmental integrity 
for all parties must form the basis for all participants in the mechanism. 
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Zusammenfassung
Die Ziele des Pariser Abkommens (PA), wie im Artikel 4 definiert, sehen ein globales Gleichgewicht der Treib-
hausgas-(THG-)Emissionen und Senken in der zweiten Hälfte des 21. Jahrhunderts vor, um den globalen 
Temperaturanstieg deutlich unter 2°C gegenüber dem vorindustriellen Wert zu begrenzen. Die Vertragsparteien 
des PA sind dazu aufgefordert ehrgeizige kurz- und langfristige Klimaschutzmaßnahmen, die zur Erreichung 
dieses Ziels beitragen, zu definieren und umzusetzen. Der in Artikel 6.4 des PA definierte neue Mechanismus 
soll eine internationale Zusammenarbeit bei der Eindämmung des Klimawandels ermöglichen und damit einen 
Beitrag zur Gesamtminderung erbringen. Dies bedeutet auch, dass alle unter Artikel 6.4 zulässigen Aktivitäten 
die Zusätzlichkeit in Bezug auf die national festgelegten Beiträge (Nationally Determined Contributions, NDCs) 
der beteiligten Länder nachweisen müssen. Angesichts der stetig wachsenden Ambitionen der NDCs stellt dies 
jedoch eine Herausforderung dar. Dennoch soll die Ausgestaltung des Mechanismus nach Artikel 6.4 ebenfalls 
sicherstellen, dass die Kompatibilität mit anderen Zielen des PA gewährleistet bleibt. Insbesondere sollten die 
Aktivitäten nicht im Widerspruch zum langfristigen Ziel von netto-null THG-Emissionen stehen, sondern 
nationale Strategien, die zu diesem Ziel führen, noch untermauern. Um diese Aspekte in den Mechanismus  
zu integrieren, muss der Fokus auf die ein oder andere Weise von kurz- und mittelfristigen Maßnahmen auf  
die langfristige Entwicklung verlegt werden. Der Fokus auf langfristige Emissionsminderungsstrategien ist 
insbesondere erforderlich, um technologische Lock-ins zu vermeiden, die eine vollständige Dekarbonisierung 
auf lange Sicht verhindern würden.
In diesem Diskussionspapier werden drei Ansätze untersucht, die dazu beitragen können, das langfristige Ziel 
von netto-null THG-Emissionen bei der Operationalisierung von Artikel 6.4 zu erreichen:
▸	 Positiv- und Negativlisten können ein einfaches Werkzeug darstellen, um einerseits die Zulassung 
bestimmter, als kompatibel bekannter Aktivitätstypen zu vereinfachen und andererseits bestimmte  
Aktivitätstypen zu klassifizieren, die mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit mit dem langfristigen Minderungsziel 
unvereinbar und somit nicht zulässig sind. Dennoch gibt es Aktivitätstypen, für die eine detailliertere 
Betrachtung erforderlich ist. Daher wird für die Betrachtung der drei Gruppen von Aktivitätstypen ein 
dreistufiger Ansatz diskutiert. Dieser Ansatz spiegelt ähnliche Ansätze wider, die für die Ausrichtung  
von Investitionen hinsichtlich der PA-Ziele gelten und stuft sie entsprechend als mit dem PA kompatibel, 
inkompatibel, oder bedingtkompatibel ein.
▸	 Zusätzlichkeit in Bezug auf eine Baseline, die sowohl mit den NDCs auch mit den langfristigen Zielen 
vereinbar ist: Die Verwendung von Baselines zum Nachweis der Zusätzlichkeit in Bezug auf die NDCs wird 
nur dann netto-null THG-Emissionen fördern, wenn der zugrundeliegende NDC bereits ambitioniert ist. 
Doch selbst in diesem Fall können Lock-ins in der langfristigen Perspektive nicht ausgeschlossen werden. 
Um das Netto-Null-Ziel zu erreichen, müssen Baselines auch langfristige Ziele berücksichtigen. Diese 
langfristige Perspektive kann entweder auf einem nationalen Netto-Null-Emissionspfad oder auf (länderun-
spezifischen) wissenschaftsbasierten Zielen beruhen. Da beide Ansätze Vor- und Nachteile haben, erscheint 
es am erfolgversprechendsten, sie so zu kombinieren, dass wissenschaftsbasierten Ziele das geforderte Maß 
an Ambition gewährleisten und gleichzeitig die Kompatibilität mit der langfristigen Strategie des Landes zur 
Entwicklung emissionsarmer Emissionen gegeben ist.
▸	 Übernahme bestehender Instrumente und Kriterien aus der Klimafinanzierung: Das Netto-Null-Ziel  
ist auch für einige bestehende Instrumente im Zusammenhang mit der Klimafinanzierung relevant. Der 
Innovationsfonds der Europäischen Union (EU) konzentriert sich auf die Unterstützung von Technologien, 
die für netto-null THG-Emissionen benötigt werden, aber aufgrund ihrer hohen Innovativität oft nicht Teil 
der Minderungspfade sind. Weiterhin definiert das EU-Klassifizierungssystem für umweltverträgliches 
Wirtschaften („EU-Taxonomie“) Kriterien und Schwellenwerte für Nachhaltigkeit für ein breites Spektrum 
von Technologiefeldern. Einige weitere Instrumente wenden das Konzept des transformativen Wandels an, 
um die langfristige Perspektive der finanzierten Programme zu berücksichtigen. Während das Konzept einige 
Verknüpfungen zur Verwendung von Baselines und Positivlisten enthält, nutzt es noch weiche Kriterien zur 
Berücksichtigung langfristiger Auswirkungen, insbesondere für die Vermeidung der Stilllegung von Aktivi-
täten aufgrund von Finanzierungs- und/oder Akzeptanzproblemen. 
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Die ausführliche Diskussion der verschiedenen Ansätze zeigt, dass die Ansätze nicht als sich gegenseitig 
ausschließend, sondern als komplementär anzusehen sind. Darüber hinaus können sie, obwohl sie zumindest 
teilweise Zusätzlichkeit adressieren, keinen vollständigen Ersatz für die Überprüfung dieser darstellen. Das 
Arbeiten mit Baselines anstelle von Positiv-/Negativlisten hat den Vorteil, dass nicht explizit Technologien 
ausgewählt werden müssen. Andererseits kann die Entwicklung von Baselines im Einklang mit langfristigen 
netto-null THG-Emissionen umständlich sein, wenn ein auf wissenschaftsbasierten Zielen gründender Ansatz 
ausgeschlossen wird. Aus den Analysen in diesem Bericht geht hervor, wie in zwei Handlungssträngen Aspekte 
der verschiedenen Ansätze auf sinnvolle Weise kombiniert werden können, um das langfristige Ziel von netto-
null THG-Emissionen über Artikel 6.4 zu unterstützen:
▸	 Im Falle politischer Machbarkeit wäre die geeignetste Vorgehensweise zunächst den dreistufigen Ansatz  
zur Erstellung der Positiv- und Negativlisten anzuwenden. Dies bedeutet, dass zu Beginn bestimmte 
Aktivitäts typen durch die Erstellung von Positiv- und Negativlisten einsortiert werden, während die  
Zulässigkeit von Aktivitätstypen, die weder auf der Positivliste noch auf der Negativliste stehen abhängig  
von weiteren definierten Kriterien sind. Im nächsten Schritt würden die verbleibenden Aktivitätstypen auf 
Grundlage eines Vergleichs mit einer Baseline bewertet, die sowohl die Zusätzlichkeit als auch die Kompa-
tibilität mit einem langfristigen Emissionsminderungspfad, der mit dem Netto-Null-Ziel im Einklang ist, 
aufzeigen sollte. In einem dritten Schritt könnten die Abnehmer mit besonders hohen Standards zusätzliche 
Kriterien für transformativen Wandel anwenden und somit das Risiko einer Aktivitätseinstellung mindern 
und zugleich eine nachhaltige Transition des betroffenen Landes fördern.
▸	 Allerdings werden Positiv- und Negativlisten mit hohen politischen Hindernissen konfrontiert sein und es 
besteht die Gefahr, dass Lobbyorganisationen starken Einfluss ausüben könnten. Daher ist es wahrschein-
licher, dass solche Listen eher von einzelnen Käufern zum Festlegen von Kaufkriterien verwendet werden.  
In diesem Fall blieben sie komplementär zu den anderen Ansätzen, aber die Vorgehensweise müsste sich 
ändern. Ausgangspunkt wäre zunächst die Einbeziehung von mit langfristigen Zielen vereinbaren Baselines, 
um Zusätzlichkeit nachzuweisen. Dadurch würden solche Aktivitäten ausgeschlossen, deren THG-Minde-
rungen nur kurzfristig zusätzlich zu NDCs sind und/oder die längerfristig zum Referenzfall werden. Einige 
der verbleibenden zulässigen Aktivitäten stimmen jedoch möglicherweise noch nicht mit dem langfristigen 
Ziel überein oder widersprechen den Anforderungen des Konzepts des transformativen Wandels. Dann 
könnten einzelne Käufer diese anhand von Positiv- und Negativlisten klassifizieren, aber auch zusätzliche 
Kriterien für die politische und finanzielle Nachhaltigkeit zur Förderung von transformativen Wandel 
anwenden. 
Mit Blick nach vorn wird es vermutlich zumindest kurzfristig schwierig sein, Mechanismen zu etablieren,  
die das langfristige Ziel von netto-null THG-Emissionen bei der Umsetzung von Artikel 6.4 unterstützen,  
da die Verhandlungen zu Artikel 6 derzeit auch ohne Berücksichtigung der hier diskutierten langfristigen 
Aspekte äußerst verfahren sind. Dennoch muss zumindest eine klare Strategie vorliegen, wie die Kompatibilität 
des Mechanismus mit dem Netto-Null-Ziel auf lange Sicht erreicht werden kann. Die hier diskutierten Optionen 
bieten einige Möglichkeiten. Angesichts der unklaren politischen Realisierbarkeit der einzelnen Ansätze scheint 
es wichtig, nicht nur an einem Ansatz festzuhalten, sondern die Flexibilität beizubehalten. In diesem 
Zusammen hang erscheint eine Umsetzung unter einem Club-Ansatz durch eine Gruppe von Ländern als erster 
Schritt praktikabler, obgleich robuste Regeln zur Gewährleistung der Umweltintegrität für alle Vertragsstaaten 
die Grundlage für alle Teilnehmer am Mechanismus bilden müssen. 
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1 Introduction and problem formulation
The objectives of the Paris Agreement (PA) in its Article 4 require a global balance of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and sinks in the second half of the 21st century in order to limit temperature increase well-below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels. The parties of the PA are required to define and implement ambitious short- and 
long-term climate change mitigation measures that contribute to achieve this objective. The parties are further-
more required to progressively raise their ambition by enhancing their targets or intensifying their mitigation 
actions.
The new mechanism defined under the Article 6.4 is required to address GHG emission reductions that are more 
ambitious than national reduction goals that are portrayed in the parties’ Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs). Demonstrating this additionality of mitigation actions in relation to an NDC baseline that already has  
a progressive character will therefore pose a key challenge.
Ambition raising can be differentiated from the concept of “overall mitigation”, which is also applied for the 
new mechanism (Art. 6.4(d)). Overall mitigation refers to the net climate benefits of measures undertaken under 
the new mechanism without any explicit reference to the NDCs. In practical terms, this differentiation means  
a shift of focus on the particular actors: while ambition raising refers to mitigation actions by individual parties, 
overall mitigation results from the collaborative action of parties through the design of the carbon market 
established under the new mechanism. The conceptual distinctions of ambition raising and overall mitigation 
are further elaborated in Fuessler et al. (2019). 
The objective to reach a global balance of GHG emissions and sinks means that GHG emissions are reduced to 
net-zero (“net-zero objective”). Some residual emissions may still be allowed if compensatory negative emission 
approaches are deployed as, for example, afforestation measures, modified agricultural practices that store 
carbon and negative emission technologies (NETs) for capture and storage of carbon. Moving towards the 
net-zero target requires international cooperation to facilitate the transfer of mitigation technologies at lower 
costs.
Taking into account also the net-zero objective introduces new challenges to the design of the new mechanism 
of Article 6.4. The new mechanism is expected not only to contribute to ambition raising and overall mitigation, 
but to reach toward the target of a net-zero world, which especially asks for long-term emission reduction 
strategies. 
Setting the focus on long-term emission reduction strategies is necessary, in particular, for avoiding techno-
logical lock-ins that would hinder a full decarbonisation in the long run. Such lock-ins may, for example,  
be caused by investments in new coal-fired power plants with higher efficiency, or insulation measures and 
heating renewal in fossil-fueled buildings, which would lead to reductions in emissions in the short term, but 
would foster a continued dependence on fossil fuels and prevent the roll-out of the full potential of renewables. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the predecessor mechanism that was defined in the Kyoto Protocol, 
fell short in addressing long-term emission reductions. Up until now, over 7,805 CDM projects and 319 
programmes of activities (PoAs) are registered worldwide, which have resulted in more than 1.98 billion 
certified emission reductions (CERs) being issued. The CDM was effective in mobilizing mitigation projects in 
developing countries, with the highest share of projects in renewable energy generation from wind, hydro and 
biomass. Many CDM projects have been centered on avoidance of methane emissions, other CDM projects 
targeted energy efficiency on either the supply or the demand side1. However, an estimated share of about 4%  
of registered CDM projects are related to fossil fuel infrastructure. Among those are ten “clean coal” plants.  
It’s arguable if those kind of projects should be covered by the new mechanism as they would contribute to 
fossil fuel lock-ins. On the other side, AFOLU activities (agriculture, forestry and land use) that enhance carbon 
sinks, made up only 0.9% of the total CDM projects (72 projects in absolute terms) and played a minor role 
under the CDM. 
1 CDM and PoA Pipeline overview, www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm
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Another challenge was the question of additionality. Additionality of emission reductions is a key pre-condition 
for making any kind of contribution to achieving the international community’s climate objectives. Over the 
years, critics repeatedly claimed that large shares of registered CDM projects might not be additional  
(e. g. Schneider 2009, Haya 2009, Cames et al. 2016). Another problem from the long-term perspective is that 
some CDM projects turned out to be vulnerable to the discontinuation of emission reductions, in particular 
those related to N2O, CH4 and F-gases. Projects at risk of discontinuation usually ceased to generate revenues 
after the funding ended. At lower risk were projects for renewable energy generation due to revenues from 
electricity sales. However, even renewable energy projects can lead to only a short-term mitigation effect,  
for example in the case of biomass usage, when after the discontinuation of the CDM project activity the 
biomass resources are used for other purposes, such as selling the biomass to third parties, and own  
electricity and heating demand are met through grid power and other fuels (Warnecke et al. 2017). 
Taking into account the similarity of the Article 6.4 mechanism to the existing CDM, it can be assumed that  
the mechanism is also more likely to incentivize short-term emission reductions. However, unlike to the CDM, 
the new mechanism must “deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions” (Art. 6.4.d), meaning that it needs 
to go beyond offsetting and have a net positive mitigation effect. Moreover, it has to support sustainable 
development, and contribute to achieving NDCs. 
A further important aspect of the design of the mechanism to consider will be the relation of the emission 
mitigation under the new mechanism and the NDCs. To achieve the objectives of the PA, the NDC target develop-
ment should follow a trajectory towards a zero emission world. However, measures under Article 6.4 should go 
beyond those targets. Countries are already obliged to reflect the highest possible level of ambition in their 
NDCs (PA Art. 4.3). Therefore, only measures that the countries cannot address on their own should be 
promoted under the new mechanism. This situation seems to be inconsistent with the aspiration of the new 
mechanism to be extensive in the long run, given that carbon trading is only possible while there is a mitigation 
potential present. There is a quite legitimate objection that the new mechanism might become obsolete in a 
net-zero world in the long run. However, many reasons speak in favor that a carbon market will be necessary or 
might even enhance ambition and that the new mechanism will have its validation in the long-term perspective. 
An acceleration of the carbon market might exhaust cost-effective mitigation measures first, leaving more 
expensive or high-risk abatement measures including NETs for later. In addition, a net-zero world does not 
imply full decarbonization everywhere, and in all sectors. Most of the mitigation scenarios of the IPCC SR1.5 
database show remaining GHG emissions in the energy, industry or transport sector, which are compensated by 
negative emissions. Negative emissions are seen as part of the solution that can either be included in national 
mitigation strategies and NDCs or be additional measures required to reach global mitigation targets if those 
efforts are not sufficient. Furthermore, differences in wealth distribution, local circumstances and capabilities 
among countries lead to different possible distribution of mitigation options. Effort sharing approaches 
discussed in literature assume global mitigation while considering national circumstances such as capability or 
historical obligation. Several effort sharing approaches suggest negative emission targets for countries with high 
capability and responsibility and more lenient targets for countries with low capability and responsibility. Such 
effort sharing approaches often indirectly require the presence of a carbon market in practical terms. Further-
more, a meta-analysis of scenarios in (Hermwille and Samadi 2016) has revealed that unequal distribution of 
wealth and emissions still will be present in 2050. The regional breakdown indicates per capita emissions are 
expected to be higher in wealthy countries as Europe and in the USA compared to the global average. Remaining 
regional differences in wealth would mean that opportunities for carbon trading will not cease in the long-term.
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In order to maintain a fit with long-term emission reduction targets, additional incentives may have to be set  
or measures must be taken to ensure compatibility. Possible starting points are e. g. to limit or incentivize 
eligible activities along a positive list that include certain project types or mitigation activities. “Clean coal” 
technologies should not qualify as a clean energy option, because those contribute to a lock-in of fossil fuel 
infrastructure. On the other hand, NETs have the potential to contribute towards achieving net-zero emissions. 
Those technologies could be promoted under the new mechanism as suggested by Honegger und Reiner (2017): 
additionally to providing credits for each ton of GHG avoided, the new mechanism could also credit each ton of 
GHG removed. Incentives for investments in technologies that are compatible with the long-term goal of 
decarboni zation could be provided e. g. through longer crediting periods or other price signals that cover long 
periods of time. Nevertheless, measures that are viable for a host country without international cooperation 
should not be implemented under Article 6.4. This also has a temporal perspective. Certain measures may not 
be viable for a host country without support at the moment, but may become viable later, at which point 
support should be re-moved. Another important factor especially in the context of certain NETs is the perma-
nence of mitigation measures. Addressing permanence is key for all activities where emission reductions or 
removals could be temporary. Permanence can either be ensured through the characterization of the mitigation 
measure itself or be complemented by a measure that addresses non-permanence.
In this report, a closer look is provided into some possible options and criteria that enable a transition to a 
low-carbon economy that might fall under the new mechanism of Article 6.4. In particular, possible ways to 
design the implementation of Article 6.4 that may foster the net-zero objective in the long-term are explored. 
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2 Options for fostering a net-zero GHG emissions world  
under the Article 6.4 Mechanism
2.1 Screening of options for an integration under the Paris Article 6.4 
Mechanism 
2.1.1 Overview
Emission reductions under Article 6.4 are required to be additional to what would have occurred in the absence 
of the crediting mechanism. Additionality could be considered and evaluated on the level of existing techno-
logies and policies of parties. However, the key challenge is the adequate selection of a baseline that is used  
to assess the additionality of a certain measure (Fuessler et al. 2019)
Experiences made with the CDM mechanism have shown the importance of assuring that mitigation effects  
go beyond the business-as-usual. Nevertheless, the CDM allowed to learn about the assessment of additionality 
in a situation where no national mitigation targets for host countries were considered. With the requirements  
of the Paris Agreement, additionality now needs to be assessed in the context of the mitigation targets of NDCs 
that have to continuously increase their mitigation ambition.
One of the most important issues in designing the new mechanism is how it will relate to the countries’ existing 
mitigation targets, and how it will impact the ambition of the future revision of NDCs. It must be ensured that 
the mechanism does not provide any incentives for host countries to minimize their own ambitions towards 
climate change mitigation to rather sell more of their emission reduction potential on the carbon markets. 
In the following, we discuss additionality only under the aspect of compatibility with a net zero world, which 
does not mean that other effects such as environmental integrity are not relevant as well. For additionality with 
respect to emissions reduction, reference to the long-term GHG development strategy and/or a baseline compa-
tible with the host countries’ targets may be suitable (see Section 2.1.3.)
In some cases, it might be worth to consider in which way principles as transformational impact towards a 
low-carbon economy or a paradigm shift of a host country are related to the concept of additionality. Similar 
principles are already applied in climate finance mechanisms and might be adapted in the context of Article 6.4 
(see Section 2.1.4).
Finally, eligible mitigation activities might differ by the role of a country – in host countries only certain 
measures could receive credits, whereas measures might be creditable only in certain sectors in receiving 
countries. This would probably require to distinguish between avoidable and unavoidable emissions of the 
receiving country that will benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions. For example, 
unavoidable emissions occur in agriculture and the industry sector (in particular cement production), while 
emissions in the transport sector are avoidable. Therefore, the use of credits in the receiving country might  
be limited to agriculture and industry (see Section 2.1.5).
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2.1.2 Establishing positive/negative lists
While in the history of the CDM the term positive list has been associated with the concept of automatic additio-
nality, it could also mean an exclusive list whereby all activity types/technologies that are not on the list are not 
eligible. For example, in the negotiations on the Marrakesh Accords, the European Union (EU) had initially 
suggested to limit eligibility under the CDM to renewable energy, energy efficiency and demand-side manage-
ment projects (UNFCCC 2000). In the context of the Paris Agreement, a similar approach could be taken to only 
allow activity types under Article 6 that are fully compatible with the goal of long-term decarbonisation. Clear 
candidates are activity types that generate zero emis-sions, for example demand-side energy efficiency and 
most renewable energy technologies, or carbon sink projects. Here, the permanence of the mitigation would 
need to be addressed in the setting of rules. A negative list would exclude certain activity types/technologies 
from eligibility. Under the CDM, Parties are to refrain from using nuclear power projects (UNFCCC 2002). 
Further discussions on banning certain technologies were triggered by the early dominance of HFC and adipic-
acid N2O projects in the CDM, which gave rise to concerns that these very inexpensive mitigation options would 
crowd out other project types. Later on, it became apparent that crediting of such activities could create 
perverse incentives. In the context of the Paris Agreement, negative lists could exclude activity types that are 
clearly incompatible with the goal of decarbonisation, such as unabated coal power projects.
However, in the history of the CDM, calls to completely ban certain project types always encountered strong 
opposition from Parties who argued that the mechanism should be technology neutral. Suggestions for positive 
or negative lists under Article 6 would likely encounter similar opposition. Nevertheless, positive/ negative lists 
were successfully implemented by clubs of acquiring countries, such as the EU.
Both approaches, negative and positive lists, come at the price of reduced coverage of the instrument. Here,  
an adequate balance between coverage and risk management should be aimed at. 
While the concept of negative lists provides some clear benefits with regard to avoiding lock-ins, it lacks a way 
to address the long-term comparability with net-zero GHG emissions. On the contrary, positive lists can be 
targeted quite directly to this issue. Therefore, possible ways to make use of positive lists could be explored in 
more detail in the following work.
2.1.3 Defining compatibility with low-emission development strategies and/or a 
baseline consistent with NDCs and long-term targets as eligibility criterion
The Paris Agreement calls on countries to formulate low greenhouse gas emission development strategies, 
mindful of the Agreement’s long-term goals (Art. 4.19). Given the risks of locking in future emissions by current 
investment decisions, long-term planning is indeed essential for achieving the Agreement’s long-term objec-
tives. In the context of the COP in Marrakech, a “2050 pathways platform” was founded which aims to support 
countries seeking to develop long-term, deep decarbonization strategies and build coalitions of cities, states, 
and companies engaged in long-term low carbon planning (UNFCCC 2016).
Under Article 6, activities taking place in countries that have established such long-term strategies could be 
required to demonstrate that they are in line with the respective host country’s long-term strategy. At the same 
time, host countries could be requested to evaluate activity proposals in the light of their strategies. However,  
as there is no pre-defined format for the long-term strategies, it may be difficult to establish a pre-defined format 
for such a demonstration and evaluation. A basic approach would consist of requiring activity proponents to 
provide narrative text explaining how the activity fits in which part of the host country’s long-term strategy.
A more promising approach would be to require the activities under Article 6.4 to be additional with regard to  
a suitable baseline that is both consistent with the host countries current NDC and longer-term trend and 
targets. However, such a baseline is difficult to obtain, in particular it might have to be changed when targets 
are updated. The feasibility of such an approach will therefore need to be explored in more detail.
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2.1.4 Adaptation of existing instruments and criteria
Criteria for determining additionality in terms of a net-zero world still need to be described. Several climate 
finance mechanisms, as the Transformative Carbon Asset Facility (TCAF), the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the 
NAMA Facility or other multilateral organizations choose funding activities that are additional in a sense of  
a transformational impact towards a low-carbon economy or a paradigm shift, and therefore aim at reaching 
beyond project finance and achieving permanent emission reductions. 
The TCAF by the World Bank supports developing countries by providing results-based finance for verified 
emission reductions. The facility has been developed in consideration of the mechanisms that fall under Article 
6. The TCAF uses crediting at sectoral or policy level. Thereby it goes beyond crediting projects in contrast to the 
CDM, which focused on projects and programs of activities. The TCAF framework defines certain criteria for the 
assessment of transformational change that is used for selecting programs. Hereby important is the demonstra-
tion of the lasting and large volume emission reduction of the activity. Furthermore, the TCAF operations are 
expected to enable the host country to increase its domestic ambition over time. They also have to incentivize 
domestic carbon pricing policies and catalyze a new and scaled-up international carbon market building on 
Article 6 through piloting of innovative approaches to scaled-up carbon crediting. The orientation for baseline 
setting under the TCAF is mainly provided by the countries unconditional NDC target. Accordingly, emission 
reductions associated with unconditional targets cannot be credited. The unconditional target trajectory is 
compared to a Business-as-Usual trajectory based on model projections. The more conservative of the two is 
used as the crediting baseline. Crediting will be then applied to the resulting difference between the crediting 
baseline and the actual emission reduction through the TCAF supported program (World Bank 2018). Hereby 
the supported program would reduce emissions beyond the unconditional NDC target. Whether and how the 
emission reductions are to be credited under Article 6 is currently open.
Another approach is offered by the Innovation Fund (IF) that has an embedded aim of long-term emission 
reductions as stated in the “Commission Delegated Regulation establishing the Innovation Fund”2. The IF sets a 
focus on innovative technologies that have the potential to contribute to GHG emission reductions substantially. 
Illustrative projects that might be funded under the IF are innovative solutions for energy storage, full or part 
chain carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects, or the electrification in industry3. The projects for designated 
funding are selected based on criteria as defined in the Delegated Regulation. These criteria include the poten-
tial to avoid GHG emissions, degree of innovation, maturity, readiness level, business model, financial and legal 
structure, potential for widespread application and cost efficiency in terms of emissions avoidance.
While the IF focusses on bringing technologies important for reaching net-zero GHG emission reductions into 
the market, all the other instruments above have in common that they use the concept of transformational 
change for the selection of programs to go beyond the project based approach. Transformational change 
includes by definition a long-term orientation where the focus lies mainly on the implementation of this 
approach in national activity or policy design that uses sustainable financial models to channel climate finance 
effectively. Nevertheless, those instruments do not explicitly focus on fostering the net-zero objective. Against 
this background, ways to adapt the criteria of the IF and a selected instrument focusing on transformational 
change may be explored in further detail.
2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-3157624_sk
3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=PI_COM%3AC%282019%291492
17Incentives for Private Sector Participation in the Article 6.4 mechanism
2.1.5 Focussing on the demand side of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes
While addressing the net-zero objective will definitely be linked to the activities in the host country in some way, 
one additional approach might also be to focus on the demand side of internationally trans-ferred mitigation 
outcomes (ITMOs). An key issue here is the supplementarity of Artcile 6.4 activities, as Buyer countries might 
choose to achieve their NDCs mostly through use of market mechanisms, neglecting the transformation of their 
own economies and thereby creating domestic lock-ins. The most straight forward restriction in this regard is to 
couple the use of ITMOs to a sufficient degree of successful implementation of domestic mitigation measures. 
However, here the question arises how to avoid that some important domestic mitigation potentials remain 
untapped. One approach would be to limit the use of credits to sectors with limited mitigation potential. Parti-
cular options might be aviation and shipping, industrial process emissions and agriculture.
Such an approach would be complimentary to the approach of establishing positive lists for activities, as it can 
be interpreted as positive lists for the use of credits. On the contrary, there is no link to the compatibility with 
net-zero emissions in the host country at all. Therefore, it is insufficient to look at it in isolation from the host 
country. We will, hence, not consider it as a separate option in the following, but discuss it as a complement  
to selected approaches to be explored in more detail.
2.1.6 Intermediary conclusion
In view of the qualitative comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches, we suggest  
to explore the feasibility of three approaches in more detail in the following, namely:
▸	 Establishing positive and negative lists for the eligibility of activities
▸	 Using a crediting baseline consistent with NDCs and long-term targets 
▸	 Adapting the criteria of two selected financing instruments as eligibility criteria for Article 6.4
The detailed analysis of the three approaches along the line of several guiding questions can be found in the 
following subsection.
2.2 Explorative analysis of selected options for an integration under the 
Paris Article 6.4 Mechanism
2.2.1 Guiding questions for the analysis of selected approaches
The explorative analyses of each of the three different approaches for a possible integration of the net-zero 
objective into an implementation of Article 6.4 will be carried out along the long lines of the following guiding 
questions: 
▸	 Instrument description: What are the targeted sectors or types of activities?  
Who are the rele-vant actors and how are they related?
▸	 How does the instrument allow to foster net-zero GHG emissions in the long-term?
▸	 Is the instrument compatible with all the relevant aspects of Article 6.4, in particular additionality?  
In which way?
▸	 Which are the benefits and drawbacks of the instrument?
▸	 What would an implementation of the instrument look like in detail (incentives, restrictions,  
selection criteria)?
▸	 Can the implementation of the instrument be expected to be politically feasible?  
How is the success of the instrument’s objectives determined (assignment of credit to the impacts over time)?
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2.2.2 Detailed consideration of the option “positive and negative lists”
2.2.2.1 Basic instrument description
Positive or negative lists could in theory provide a straightforward way to limit activities under Article 6 to 
activity types that are compatible with the long-term net zero emissions objective. One could simply decide that 
activity types that are not compatible with the long-term objective will not be eligible. Alternatively, a positive 
list could be used to especially promote activity types that are clearly compatible with the long-term objective, 
but leaving the door open for activities of other types to demonstrate their compatibility. It is important to note 
that the considerations here only apply to the long-term objective of net-zero emissions, but should not replace 
the need to provide evidence for the additionality of the activities.
In this vein, positive lists for compatibility with long-term net zero emissions could take a “hard” or a “soft” 
approach:
▸	 In the “hard” approach, only activity types would be eligible for the mechanism that are 100% compatible 
with the net zero emissions objective. This approach would follow the logic of the original EU suggestion  
to limit the CDM to renewable energy, energy efficiency and demand-side management projects. However, 
the list of activities compatible with the long-term objective would certainly be different, e. g. dropping 
energy efficiency of fossil technologies but maybe including also activity types related to natural and 
technical carbon sinks.
▸	 In the “soft” approach, there would not be a predefined eligibility list, but all activity proposals would  
need to perform an analysis to demonstrate that they are aligned with the long-term objective. However,  
the requirement to perform this analysis could be waived for certain activity types where it is clear that they 
are always 100% compatible with the long-term objective. This approach follows the logic of the existing 
positive lists in the CDM and other offset mechanisms. While in principle all activities need to demonstrate 
their additionality, the CDM Executive Board has developed a list of small-scale and micro-scale project 
types that are deemed to always be additional. Several other offset mechanisms have also developed positive 
lists of activity types that are automatically deemed to be additional (Kachi et al. 2014, Kollmuss and Füssler 
2015).
This approach could in principle be mirrored for negative lists:
▸	 A “hard” approach would completely ban certain activity types.
▸	 A “soft” approach could consist of defining additional requirements for activity types that would normally 
be assumed to be incompatible with the long-term objective.
Positive and negative lists could also be combined to form a tiered approach:
▸	 Tier 1 could consist of activity types that are always deemed to be compatible with the long-term objective.
▸	 Tier 2 could consist of activity types that need to demonstrate their compatibility with the long-term  
objective.
▸	 Tier 3 could consist of activity types that are banned as they are incompatible with the long-term objective.
The lists should be reviewed regularly to capture economic and technological developments. Some technologies 
that may be relevant for achieving the long-term objective may not be known yet (Schneider et al. 2015).
This basic concept could be adopted by various actors. Such lists could in theory be defined multilaterally under 
the Paris Agreement to apply to all activities under Article 6. Alternatively, buyers could develop such lists to 
determine which activities to select for their own purchases. Such lists may also be developed by governments 
to determine eligibility of Article 6 units for use in domestic emission trading systems.
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2.2.2.2 Categorising activity types
The discussion on which activity types to assign to which tier can be informed by the discussions that have been 
triggered by the objective in Art. 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement to align all financial flows with the objectives of 
the Agreement. Currently, there is an intensive discussion on what exactly this objective should mean for the 
multilateral development banks (MDBs), that is, which activities should be funded by the MDBs and which 
should not. This discussion shows that the question of what is compatible with the long-term objectives of the 
PA is easy to answer for some sectors and activity types, but not so easy to answer for others. For example, for 
the transport sector, Larsen et al. (2018) consider that only transport infrastructure that is built solely for the 
transport of fossil fuels can clearly be seen as misaligned. For transport infrastructure in general they consider 
that it depends on the characteristics of the individual activity whether the spending is aligned or misaligned.
Germanwatch & NewClimate Institute (2018) develop a typology where they classify investment areas into  
three categories: “Paris-aligned”, “misaligned” and “conditional”, which reflect the three tiers suggested above. 
“Paris-aligned” means investments in this area fully support the achievement of the Paris Agreement’s tempera-
ture goal. “Misaligned” means investments in this area undermine achievement of the long-term objective. 
Whether investments that are classified as “conditional” can be considered Paris-aligned depends on the 
circumstances and characteristics of a specific activity. Such investments therefore need decision-making tools 
on the level of activities to determine whether or not a specific activity is aligned or misaligned (e. g. baseline 
comparisons as described in Section 2.2.3). The following table applies this typology to investments in trans-
port and energy supply infrastructure. It bears noting that these categories may shift over time. For example, 
building new gas power plants may be Paris-aligned in the short term but will over time become increasingly 
incompatible with the objective to fully decarbonise electricity generation. As noted above, positive/negative 
lists would therefore need to be dynamic and updated regularly.
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Renewable energy  
(solar, wind, small hydro, 
tidal, wave and ocean)
Energy transmission and 
distribution infrastructure
Coal-fired power plants with 
unabated emissions over 
their lifetime
Electricity system  
flexibility option
Geothermal 2) New upstream oil and gas 
production and exploration
Gas (power plants,  
transport of gas) 1)
Coal mining
Large hydropower 3) Oil power plants
Biomass, incl. bio energy 
carbon capture & storage 3)










ding tunnels and bridges
New road, rail, water-way 




and bikelanes, bike sharing 
infrastructure)
Diesel rail and rolling stock New airports/ 
airport expansion 4)
Integrated transport and 
urban development planning
Port expansion for transport 
of non-fossil fuel freight
Electric rail and rolling stock
Electric public transport
Inland waterways
Transport and travel 
demand management 
measures
1) This investment area causes direct GHG emissions
2) This investment area can cause direct GHG emissions
3) This investment area is subject to critical sustainability and/or security concerns
4)  Alternatives to air travel are more limited compared to other areas, there is therefore a need to investigate  
fuel alternatives.
 Source: Germanwatch & NewClimate Institute 2018
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2.2.2.3 Advantages and disadvantages of an approach based on positive/negative lists
Establishment of positive or negative lists would set a clear direction for Article 6 use towards the long-term 
net-zero emission objective. Activity types that are clearly incompatible with the long-term objective could 
simply be disallowed, avoiding lock-in effects that would make achievement of the long-term objective more 
difficult.
Technical feasibility and ease of implementation would among other factors depend on the actor using the 
instrument. Individual buyers using their own money may find it relatively simple to rule out or prioritise 
certain activities. By contrast, development of such lists for the entire mechanism at the level of the CMA or  
of the supervisory body, or for use in domestic emission trading systems, would probably require detailed 
technical assessments of mitigation scenarios in order to satisfy all stakeholders that the lists are robust and 
well-founded. A key difficulty herein is that the role of individual activity types may vary strongly among 
scenarios. In addition, different countries may have different preferences for which technologies to choose for 
their long-term climate strategies (Schneider et al. 2015). For example, one may consider carbon capture and 
storage to be a viable option for the electricity sector, but one may also consider that the limited storage poten-
tial should be reserved for emissions where currently no other abatement options exist, such as certain indust-
rial process emissions, e. g. in cement production. 
Another related difficulty is the overall level of ambition. The PA aims at achieving net-zero emissions in  
the second half of the century. However, the IPCC special report on the 1.5°C limit has highlighted that CO2 
emissions should be reduced to net zero already by around 2050 in order to maintain a relevant chance of 
limiting global temperature increase to 1.5°C (IPCC 2018). Whether emissions should arrive at net zero already 
in 2050 or only later, for example 2070, makes a strong difference for the assessment of which current invest-
ments are Paris-aligned. Given the IPCC special report’s conclusion that every bit of warming matters, the aim 
should be to reduce emissions to net zero as soon as possible.
Given these complexities, political feasibility for broad application at a CMA or supervisory body level is 
probably also low. Related to positive lists for additionality, du Monceau and Brohé (2011) note that attempting 
to define such lists would probably be subjected to intensive lobbying by Parties and private companies to have 
their favourite activity types included. The same can be expected for lists on compatibility with the long-term 
objective. And as noted above, in the history of the CDM many Parties strongly advocated for keeping the 
mechanism technology neutral.
On this basis, positive/negative lists may be a useful instrument for individual buyers, but are probably difficult 
to agree on for the mechanism as a whole.
Finally, it needs to be kept in mind that positive lists for compatibility with the long-term objective must not be 
taken as substitute for additionality testing. While, for example, solar PV and wind power technologies generate 
zero GHG emissions during their operation, they are increasingly cost competitive and may hence in many cases 
nowadays constitute the baseline rather than being additional. Selection of activities therefore needs to care-
fully assess both angles, which activities are additional and which ones contribute to the long-term objective. 
2.2.3 Detailed consideration of the option “using a crediting baseline consistent with 
NDCs and long-term targets” 
This section further explores approaches that require the activities under Article 6.4 to be additional with regard 
to a suitable baseline that is consistent with both the host countries current NDC and longer-term trends and 
targets, in particular the long-term objective of net-zero GHG emissions.
Three options are identified on how to determine baselines (and additionality) in a way that is in line with 
longer-term trends and targets:
▸	 Baselines in line with (ambitious) NDC targets 
▸	 Baselines defining a new long-term view
▸	 Baselines with science-based targets
These three options are discussed in detail in the following.
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2.2.3.1 Baselines in line with (ambitious) NDC targets
Baselines can be defined in line with the NDC target for any sector and type of activity. Applying this approach 
assures that only emission reductions beyond the country’s NDC targets can be credited and internationally 
traded (cf. figure below). The advantage of this approach is that it minimizes the risk for over-transferring  
of emission reductions and at the same time maximizing the potential amount of transferrable emission  
reductions. The baseline needs be set below the NDC target emission pathway. In this case, the country would 
not fully exploit the opportunity to transfer mitigation outcomes and therewith the potential revenues of the 














































Source: Broekhoff et al. 2017
Figure 1:  Example of a baseline derived from NDC targets 
NDCs represent the country’s interpretation on what its ability and commitment is to contribute to the overall 
long-term goal of the Paris Agreement. If the country’s NDC ambition is in line with the long-term goal, the use 
of Article 6 with crediting baseline that is in line with the NDC target may help to prevent lock-in but cannot 
fully exclude it. If ambition is insufficient (as is the case with many NDCs – see UNEP 2018) this leads to lock-in 
(as described in section 1).
A challenge in many host countries for defining a baseline trajectory is that many NDCs are not quantified in 
discrete sectoral GHG emission pathways. The translation of NDC targets in such pathways for covered sources 
can require considerable preparatory work. An additional problem is the issue whether crediting mechanisms 
can be used to achieve conditional NDCs. It is an open question whether the conditionality of NDC targets has to 
be taken into account in the baseline definition, particularly in cases when countries have conditional as well as 
unconditional targets (Broekhoff et al. 2017). 
The lack of discrete emission pathways for covered sources in many countries NDCs is a problem, as demonstra-
tion of additionality and baseline setting in line with NDC targets is considered to be easiest on a sector level. 
The definition on a activity or program level appears more difficult. In order to capture potential future ambition 
increases of NDC targets, crediting periods have either to be limited or additionality demonstration or baseline 
setting should be updated regularly (Schneider et al. 2017). 
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Under the assumption that a host country has an ambitious NDC target that is in line with a global net-zero 
pathway, will achieve them, and double counting is avoided, this approach leads to additional contributions  
of a crediting program and can help to achieve net-zero GHG emissions in the long-term by ensuring only 
additional mitigation outcomes are traded. Although there is no international agreement on what ambitious 
means, there are different approaches including the Climate Action Tracker (CAT4) that provides independent 
research on countries ambition levels. In terms of market dynamics, it should be noted that host countries that 
decide to have more ambitious NDC targets reduce their potential of “low hanging fruits”, as this mitigation 
potential is required for domestic action to achieve the NDC target, and as a result face the international market 
with an offer of higher priced units that may not be able to compete. In that sense the market mechanism do not 
create a level playing field for host countries with different ambition levels (see Fuessler et al. 2019).
2.2.3.2 Baselines independent of NDC targets
If the NDC target is ambitious enough and thereby in line with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, the 
baseline based on the NDC target can be used to estimate transferrable mitigation outcomes that are additional 
(see section 2.2.3.1). However, there are several cases where the baseline cannot be set in line with NDC targets. 
The NDC target may not to be sufficient to provide an adequate contribution in fulfilling the long-term goals of 
the Paris Agreement, or the mitigation activity (to be transferred) may not be quantified or not covered by the 
scope of the NDC target. In these cases, the baseline cannot be estimated, or the additionality of a transferred 
mitigation outcome is not ensured when setting a baseline in line with the NDC target. Two alternative approa-
ches may be used to determine a baseline that is in accordance with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement 
and that allow for estimating transferrable reductions which are additional: (a) defining a new long-term view 
(what might be called a “Long-Term Determined Contribution” or “LT-DC”) and (b) “science-based targets”. 
These two options are discussed below. 
▸	 Defining a new Long-Term Determined Contribution (“LT-DC”): A new LT-DC is defined for the sector 
that the considered mitigation activity is in. This may e. g. be carried out by an independent research organi-
zation in a mandate from both the acquiring and host country. The approach to reach at the LT-DC is similar 
as the approach for the NDC, including an analysis of capacities, capabilities and responsibilities, modelling 
and long-term emissions and development strategies (LT-LEDS), but is not carried out by the government. 
The boundary condition is that the LT-DC target has to be in line with reaching the long-term goals of 
net-zero GHG emissions.
▸	 Science-based target: This simple approach follows a method that is often used in the context of the so 
called “science-based targets” for financial investments, e. g. in the context of green bonds certification. 
Similar to the LT-DC, the science-based target can also be defined for the sector that the considered mitiga-
tion approach is in5. The baseline is assumed as a straight line. It starts at actual average emissions before 
the implementation of the mitigation action and descends to a target which is in line with the long-term 
goals of the Paris Agreement. 
E. g., if a new building of a specific size emits on average 60 tonnes of CO2 per year, the baseline for an energy 
efficient building newly built in 2020 would start at 60t/a, reach 40t in 2030, 20t in 2040 and 0t in 2050.  
In addition, science-based targets would need to address the renovations of the existing building stock but  
also the stock built up until 2050.
2.2.3.3 Advantages and disadvantages of using baselines based on long-term targets
Defining a new LT-DC is the more comprehensive approach of the two, taking into account emission models and 
LT-LEDs and building on a country’s specific capacity and capability. The approach may be particularly cumber-
some in countries with an insufficient data lacking a quantified NDC target. In case of very limited national and 
international resources, the approach with a science-based target is very simple to apply and can be used 
similarly for all mitigation activities and sectors. 
If the LC-DC is defined ambitious enough and is achieved, this approach will lead to contributions of a crediting 
program additional to the host country meeting its NDC target – similar to the baseline in line with the NDC 
target. 
4 https://climateactiontracker.org/
5 E. g.: sciencebasedtargets.org
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However, all approaches that use ambitious crediting baselines, be it based on an ambitious NDC, new long-
term view or a simple science based target approach, indirectly incentivize mitigation activities with very  
low emissions, but are not sufficient to rule out the implementation of technologies which lead to a lock-in  
of higher carbon intensity over decades and are not in line with the long-term zero emissions objective.
2.2.4 Detailed consideration of the option “Adaptation of existing instruments and 
criteria”
This subsection further explores how existing instruments try to foster the long-term objective of net-zero GHG 
emissions and whether it is possible to adapt some of the criteria they use for an application in the context  
of Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement. First, the Transformative Carbon Asset Facility and its concept of trans-
formational change are assessed. Afterwards, the approach and criteria of the EU Innovation Fund and the  
EU classification system for environmentally sustainable economic activities (“EU Taxonomy”) of the European 
Commission are scrutinized.
2.2.4.1 Transformative Carbon Asset Facility (TCAF)
The TCAF is a multilateral World Bank fund that was launched in 2016 and is meant to implement market-
based climate change mitigation mechanisms and provide results-based finance for proven emission reductions 
achieved on sectoral level. For this purpose, the facility funds emissions reductions achieved through large 
scale programs (e. g. phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies or the simplification of renewable energy regulations)  
in sectors as renewable energy, transport, energy efficiency, solid waste management, and low carbon cities6. 
The following assessment of the TCAF (if not stated otherwise) is based on the currently available general 
principles presented in “Core parameters for TCAF operations” (World Bank 2018).
The TCAF refers to the concept of transformational change towards a low carbon sustainable development path 
in the host country. Transformational change indicators are for example derived from country/sector-specific 
long-term decarbonisation pathways consistent with a global least-cost path-way to a achieve the “well-below” 
2°C climate target, or through a preferred alternative approach, based on best practice with regard to transfor-
mational mitigation measures. Thereby, the concept of transformational change may provide a link to the 
net-zero objective. 
Transformational change can also be understood as a activity’s potential to transform the development path of 
a sector and lead to a substantial deviation from the baseline scenario, linking it to the discussion of baselines 
in Section 2.2.3. The concept is used for selecting programs for finance and to monitor the program according  
to pre-defined criteria and indicators. 
The TCAF defines transformational change as the “required structural change” to achieve net zero emissions in 
the second half of the century. TCAF programs are supposed to be policy-based or target sector transformation. 
The TCAF framework defines four criteria to assess transformational impact of a financed program:
a) achieve large volume of emission reductions (at least 5 Mt CO2e over 5–7 years)
b) emission reductions have to be sustainable over time
c) enabling the host country to increase its domestic ambition over time
d) contribute to the development and implementation of domestic carbon pricing policies and catalyze  
a new and scaled-up international carbon market under Article 6
The volume constraint a) originates from the large-scale program focus of the TCAF and refers to a dimension  
of transformational change not directly relevant to the net-zero objective. 
6 www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/11/30/new-500-million-initiative-to-boost-large-scale-climate-action-in-developing-countries
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The TCAF assesses sustainability (as named under b) of an activity based on the technology, policy and  
financing metrics. Technology sustainability would be assured if the TCAF program uses a technology that is 
consistent with long-term decarbonisation pathways. The decarbonization pathways on country/sector level  
are developed through modelling long-term pathways that take a least-cost perspective and avoidance of  
lock-in effects into consideration. The extent of the transformational impact of a technology should demonstrate  
a contribution to a system change towards a net-zero development. Pathway consistency is determined  
by technology specific indicators. Sustainability with regard to the policy dimension is measured by the accep-
tance of the TCAF supported policy in the host country. Financial sustainability is assessed through the long 
term strategy that allows mitigation of GHG emissions to continue at a similar or higher level after the public 
funding has ceased. 
The TCAF can be thought of as two-layered. It applies a market mechanism layer by providing verified emission 
reductions that could be credited under the Article 6 mechanism, but at the same time also applies a climate 
finance logic by providing results-based climate finance for eligible programs. The TCAF is committed to ensure 
additionality in both layers. As a crediting mechanism on the sectoral level the TCAF considers the host country 
to contribute towards domestic mitigation efforts in a particular sector aligned with the countries unconditional 
NDC target. Only by permitting activities in sectors that are covered by an unconditional NDC would demons-
trate in what way additionality could be achieved through the TCAF activity. Furthermore, a second crediting 
baseline is established. Emissions that are achieved below this more stringent baseline are considered additi-
onal and, hereby, creditable. Through this methodology the TCAF wants to ensure additionality in a way that 
only activities are credited which surmount the current ambition of the host countries and would not appear in 
the absence of a TCAF intervention. 
According to the outline of the TCAF, the increase of ambition can be linked to the creation of a secondary 
market. The transformational impact is then determined by the ability to mobilize additional public and private 
finance. It is not clear how the private sector is integrated. The mechanism is designed to be policy-driven in the 
first place (and less incentives are provided to encourage a secondary market). To generate creditable emission 
reductions requires using conservative baselines, stringent monitoring and accounting practices. 
At the current stage, however, the question whether achieved emissions reductions with support of the TCAF  
are supposed to be credited under Article 6.2 or Article 6.4 remains open, but it is more likely that the policy-
scale design of the activities funded by the facility as well as the orientation along the unconditional target of 
the host country rather correspond with activities that would fall under Article 6.2. In any case, TCAF activities 
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Source: own diagram based on World Bank (2018) 
Figure 2:  TCAF baseline and crediting threshold
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2.2.4.2  Advantages and disadvantages of adapting criteria from the TCAF
The question here is in which way Article 6.4 is suitable to allow for sectoral emission crediting and/or to 
specifically integrate criteria of transformational change as a form of considering long-term emission reduc-
tions. Currently, only the general principles of the TCAF baseline methodology are made available. So only 
general conclusions could be derived if the concept of transformational change can be integrated into the 
design of Article 6.4. In addition, no information on the role of AFOLU sector was available, which may play  
an important role to foster net-zero GHG emissions.
Sectoral crediting has the potential to incentivize more ambitious mitigation efforts in the host country by 
triggering action on a larger scale than a project-based approach. Depending on the setting of the crediting 
threshold, it would assure additionality and could have a transformational impact on the respective sector 
hereby leading to long-term impacts in terms of emission reductions. A concern would be for example the 
definition of the scope of the sector in question, which can be complex and hetero-geneous on the sublevel.  
The overarching drivers of transformational change refer to processes that scale-up clean technologies, 
economic incentives that support the transformative processes, involved agents (e. g. governments, private 
sector, networks), change of societal norms and practices. The assessment of sectoral transformation requires 
performance criteria that would highly depend on local circumstances and are context specific, but may not  
be suitable for a carbon market that operates globally. On the other hand, the definition of internationally viable 
criteria would pose limitations on the assessment of creditable emissions as they would be defined too broadly 
to determine additionality of an activity. As an additional method an assessment of transformational change 
could be part of an integrated context specific approach for the selection of activities under Article 6.4.  
For example the out-comes of a transformative action could be determined through achieving GHG mitigation 
and sustainable development at a large scale that is sustained over time.
By focusing on technologies in line with long-term decarbonisation and targeting a lasting impact of programs, 
emphasizing that a credible path that ensures sustainability of emission reductions after the end of financial 
support should be evident, the TCAF establishes a link towards long-term GHG emissions reduction goals. 
However, this link remains vague and it is unclear whether there are objective criteria that foster the net-zero 
objective. If so, these will probably be based on the positive and negative lists for technologies and/or baselines, 
thereby aligning with the approaches discussed in the preceding section. The other criteria for transformational 
change can then be seen as soft criteria, making sure the long-term viability of the supported programs. This 
could be an additional criterion to apply to activities under Article 6.4. However, this would make the hurdles 
for the eligibility of an activity even higher, which entails the risk of a very limited market volume.
2.2.4.3 Innovation Fund (IF)
The IF has been established by the EU to facilitate the rapid introduction of new low-carbon technologies  
to enable the low-carbon transition of the EU’s economy and to reach its long-term decarbonization goals.  
The idea is to derisk validated innovative low-carbon technologies that would otherwise not attract commercial 
finance, and follow them through the pilot, demonstration, and scale-up stages. The legal basis for the opera-
tion of the Innovation Fund is Article 10a(8) of the EU ETS Directive (Directive 2003/87/EC, as amended by the 
Directive 2018/410), supplemented by the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/856. The regulation 
sets the framework for the operation of the fund. The first call for proposals will be launched in 20207.
The financial support will be mainly distributed through grants and the IF intends to cover 60% of relevant 
costs. The relevant costs are defined as the difference in costs and revenues that arise in a 10 years period after 
the beginning of operation of the project compared to the same calculation for a conventional technology.  
In terms of adaptability of the methodology to Article 6.4, it might be an option to choose a reference techno-
logy that is referred to in the NDC baseline of a host country and to provide finance for technologies with higher 
emission reduction potential or even more innovative technologies that are assessed on similar criteria applied 
in the IF. For example, if the NDC baseline foresees a substitution of coal by gas, a substitution by renewable 
gases could be credited under Article 6.4 with avoided emissions and relevant costs split based on the com pa-
rison with use of natural gas.
7 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/innovation-fund_en
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The IF shall foster net-zero GHG emissions in the EU in the long-term by targeting cutting-edge technologies 
with a high long-term abatement potential. Projects eligible under the IF will be selected based on their level  
of innovation according to pre-defined selection criteria. Projects are assessed on their level of effectiveness  
of GHG emissions avoidance, innovation, maturity, scalability and cost efficiency. The project pipeline is 
supposed to support a variety of technologies in various eligible sectors as low-carbon technologies in energy 
intensive industry, innovative renewable energy generation, energy storage, carbon capture and utilisation 
(CCU) and CCS, which are meant to be required for long-term decarbonisation. Due to the technological focus, 
the AFOLU sector does not play a major role under the IF. Accordingly, the list of expected project types may 
serve as an input to the creation of positive lists described in Section 2.2.2, but will need to be extended, in 
particular with regard to the AFOLU sector. The latter may play a key role in fostering the net-zero objective  
by providing carbon sinks, e. g. via afforestation. Illustrative examples of potential projects as outlined in  
the Commission Delegated Regulation with regard to the operation of the IF (European Commission, 2019) 
are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Illustrative examples of potential projects under the Innovation Fund
Category of 
sectors
Sectors eligible  
under Article 10a(8)  
of Directive 2003/87/EC
Examples of potential projects
Renewable energy
Wind energy  ▸ Floating	off-shore	wind	power	plants	
 ▸ Next generation turbines
Solar energy  ▸ Concentrated solar power plants 
 ▸ Flexible organic cells
 ▸ Floating photovoltaics installations
 ▸ Hybrid photovoltaic, concentrating solar power and storage 
technologies
Geothermal energy  ▸ Enhanced geothermal systems
Bioenergy  ▸ Advanced biofuels
Ocean energy  ▸ Tidal and wave energy technologies
Energy storage Energy storage 
 ▸ Product innovation (e. g. thermal storage, pumped heat 
electricity	storage,	flow	batteries,	lithium	ion	or	post	lithium	
technology, compressed air and liquid air energy storage) 
 ▸ Process	innovation	(e.	g.	block	chain	technologies	and	artificial	
intelligence)
 ▸ System innovation (e. g. energy management systems and 
charging stations at ports)
 ▸ Large scale demonstration of renewable hydrogen production 
and its use for energy storage (e. g. electrolysis of water  
coupled with hydrogen storage systems) 
Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) 
Carbon Capture  
and Storage (CCS) 
 ▸ Full chain CCS projects 
 ▸ Part chain CCS projects, with secured storage contracts
Carbon capture  
and utilisation (CCU) 
Carbon Capture  
and Utilisation 
 ▸ Capturing CO2	and	other	carbon	containing	gaseous	effluents	
and converting them to useable fuels or products 
29Incentives for Private Sector Participation in the Article 6.4 mechanism
Category of 
sectors
Sectors eligible  
under Article 10a(8)  
of Directive 2003/87/EC
Examples of potential projects
Industry 
Manufacture of coke and 
refined	petroleum	products	
 ▸ Switching to low carbon hydrogen 
 ▸ Use of alternative sustainable feedstocks
Manufacture of basic ferrous 
metals 
 ▸ New smelting reduction technologies
 ▸ Direct reduction technologies, based on low-carbon hydrogen 
 ▸ Electricity-based steel production
 ▸ Top gas recycling
Manufacture of basic  
non-ferrous metals 
 ▸ Low emission electrolysis 
 ▸ Inert anodes/wetted drained cathodes
 ▸ Magnetic billet heating
 ▸ Waste heat recovery
Cement and concrete  
product manufacturing 
 ▸ Less carbon cement 
 ▸ Low carbon cement
 ▸ Changes in concrete composition
Lime and gypsum product 
 ▸ Increase of CO2 concentration e. g. by looping 
 ▸ Combination with oxygen-fuel process
Glass and glass product  
manufacturing 
 ▸ Electric furnaces 
 ▸ Oxygen-fuel combustion (incl. heat recovery)
 ▸ Fuel switch to biofuels or low carbon hydrogen
 ▸ Batch reformulation and batch palletisation (e. g. non-carbonated 
materials or glass with lower melting temperature)
Clay product and refractory 
manufacturing 
 ▸ Electric furnaces and dryers 
 ▸ Design	of	non-fired	or	low-fired	products
 ▸ Other product innovations
Manufacture of paper and 
paper products 
 ▸ New drying techniques 
 ▸ Foaming	of	fibrous	materials
 ▸ Black	liquor	gasification
 ▸ Enzymatic pre-treatment
 ▸ Heat recovery;
 ▸ Electrochemical depolymerisation of lignin.
Manufacture of chemicals  
and chemical products 
 ▸ Utilisation or better utilisation of alternative sources of carbon: 
CO2, biomass, waste, exhaust gases, residues and recycled 
materials 
 ▸ Materials “breakthroughs” (e. g. high performance functional 
materials including lightweight materials for low-carbon  
energy, mobility and housing)
 ▸ Utilisation of renewable electricity
 ▸ Production and use of low carbon hydrogen
 ▸ Electrified	processes	including	through	non-conventional	
energy forms
Other sectors covered  
by Annex I to Directive 
2003/87/EC 
 ▸ Production of low carbon hydrogen with renewable electricity 
or with CCS
 ▸ Innovative low-carbon tyre production
Cross-cutting Cross-cutting projects  and industrial symbiosis 
 ▸ Any combination of the above 
 ▸ Carbon capture from several industrial plants, transport of CO2, 
utilisation and storage
 ▸ Production and demonstration of new chemistry large-scale 
batteries
 ▸ Low-carbon hydrogen use and storage, and infrastructure 
projects
 ▸ Electric charging
 ▸ Hybrid renewable energy systems
 ▸ Industrial heat systems using heat pumps
Source: European Commission (2019) 
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2.2.4.4 EU classification system for environmentally sustainable economic activities 
To enhance sustainable finance, the EU Commission’s Technical Expert Group (TEG) on sustainable finance 
published a draft of an EU classification system for environmentally sustainable economic activities (“EU 
Taxonomy”) in June 2019 (EU TEG, 2019). This report is intended to set the taxonomy for decisions in future  
EU legislation. The EU Taxonomy contains an EU classification system and provides guidance on how to screen 
environmental sustainable activities. According to the EU Taxonomy an economic activity is listed as sustain-
able if it at least contributes to one of the six defined environmental objectives (climate change mitigation, 
climate change adaptation, sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources, transition to a 
circular economy, waste prevention and recycling, pollution prevention and control, protection of healthy 
ecosystems), not to undermine the other objectives, and to comply with minimum social safeguards and 
technical screening criteria. The first report on the EU Taxonomy focuses only the objectives on climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, but it is supposed to be gradually complimented. The current version of the EU 
Taxonomy includes eight macro-sectors with corresponding economic activities that are considered to substan-
tially contribute to the mitigation objective. Table 3 shows the macro-sectors and activities that are currently 
included in the EU Taxonomy.
Table 3: Macro-sectors and economic activities that contribute to the climate change mitigation 
objective, as selected by the TEG and outlined in the EU Taxonomy
NACE macro-sector Activities
Agriculture,	forestry	and	fishing
Growing of perennial crops







Manufacture of Low carbon technologies 
Manufacture of Low carbon technologies 
Manufacture of Cement
Manufacture of Aluminium
Manufacture of Iron and Steel
Manufacture of Hydrogen
Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals
Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals
Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds
Manufacture of plastics in primary form
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NACE macro-sector Activities
Electricity, gas, steam  
and air conditioning supply
Production of Electricity from Solar PV
Production of Electricity from Solar PV
Production of Electricity from Concentrated Solar Power
Production of Electricity from Wind Power
Production of Electricity from Ocean Energy
Production of Electricity from Hydropower
Production of Electricity from Geothermal
Production of Electricity from Gas Combustion
Production of Electricity from Bioenergy
Transmission and Distribution of Electricity
Storage of Energy
Manufacture of Biomass, Biogas or Biofuels
Retrofit	of	Gas	Transmission	and	Distribution	Networks
District Heating/Cooling Distribution
Installation and operation of electric heat pumps
Cogeneration of Heat/cool and Power from Concentrated Solar Power
Cogeneration of Heat/Cool and Power from Geothermal Energy
Cogeneration of Heat/Cool and Power from Gas Combustion 
Cogeneration of Heat/Cool and Power from Bioenergy 
Production of Heat/Cool from Concentrated Solar Power 
Production of Heat/Cool from Geothermal 
Production of Heat/Cool from Gas Combustion 
Production of Heat/Cool from Bioenergy 
Production of Heat/Cool using Waste Heat
Water, sewerage, waste and remediation
Water collection, treatment and supply
Centralized Wastewater treatment systems
Anaerobic Digestion of Sewage sludge
Separate collection and transport of non-hazardous waste in source-segrega-
ted fractions
Anaerobic digestion of bio-waste
Composting of bio-waste
Material recovery from waste
Landfill	gas	capture	and	energetic	utilization
Direct Air Capture of CO2
Capture of Anthropogenic Emissions
Transport of CO2
Permanent Sequestration of captured CO2
Transportation and storage
Passenger rail transport (inter-urban)
Freight rail transport
Public transport
Infrastructure for low carbon transport
Passenger cars and commercial vehicles
Freight transport services by road
Interurban scheduled road transport
Inland passenger water transport
Inland freight water transport
Construction of water projects
ICT
Data processing, hosting and related activities
Data-driven solutions for GHG emissions reductions
Construction and real estate activities
Construction of new buildings 
Renovation of existing buildings 
Individual renovation measures, installation of renewables onsite and profes-
sional,	scientific	and	technical	activities	
Acquisition of buildings 
 Source: EU TEG (2019)
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The process for the development of technical screening criteria by the TEG follows three major steps. First, 
priority sectors were selected based on the amount of GHG emissions and using the EU NACE code industry  
classification system. Second, the TEG identified and categorized activities within each sector that have a 
potential to substantially contribute to climate change mitigation. The definition of “substantial” contribution 
to climate change mitigation was used as provided under Article 6.1, as well as EU’s aim for net-zero in 2050. 
The EU Taxonomy excludes activities that might result in lock-in into carbon intensive assets. Furthermore,  
a distinction between economic activities was made based on their contribution to net-zero objective:
(1) Activities that are already low-carbon with stable and long-term technical screening criteria  
(“green activities”)
(2) Activities that contribute to net-zero in 2050, but do not currently achieve a net-zero carbon emissions 
level with technical screening criteria that will be revised over time as the technology evolves towards 
net-zero (“greening of” activities)
(3) Activities that enable low carbon performance or enable substantial emissions reductions  
(“greening by” activities)
Finally, technical screening criteria were developed consisting of three components:  
principles (under-lying rationale of the selected activity), metrics, and thresholds.
In the EU Taxonomy, the TEG recognizes the net-zero target for 2050 and acknowledges the need for zero  
carbon and sequestration technologies. For example, according to the current version of the EU Taxonomy  
the threshold for passenger cars and commercial vehicles would be eligible as “green” if their emission intensity 
does not exceed 50g CO2/km until 2025 and 0g CO2/km thereafter. Production of electricity from gas combus-
tion is included but only facilities operating at life cycle missions lower than 100g CO2e/kWh while declining  
to 0g CO2e/kWh by 2050 (which would require the use of CCS and/or so-called green gas, i. e. gas produced 
from renewable energies). Accordingly, the EU taxonomy might be adapted to an application to activities  
that will fall under Article 6 of the PA.
2.2.4.5 Advantages and disadvantages of adapting criteria from the IF and the EU Taxonomy
Selecting specific innovation criteria for technologies that foster long-term emission reductions is a challenge 
that is also encountered by the IF. A low threshold for innovation criteria would enable more available options, 
but neglect to set the focus on impact prioritization, while a high threshold would narrow down the available 
technologies for selection and define a certain technology pathway (Duwe and Ostwald, 2018). Although not 
explicitly referred to as additionality in the framework of the IF, the aspect of additionality is met by the defini-
tion of the relevant costs that are determined compared to a baseline technology.
The IF has a predominantly European perspective. Therefore, the technologies considered may not be compre-
hensive. In particular, the AFOLU sector which is important in the context of net-zero GHG emission is not 
covered. This may limit the potential to transfer the criteria and the methodologies. However, proven innovative 
technologies that pass the deployment phase have a potential to be transferred and adopted internationally.  
So the project types expected under the IF may at least form a starting point for the creation of the positive  
lists to be applied under Article 6.4.
The methodology of splitting avoided emissions and relevant costs has already been established under the 
NER300 mechanism, which preceded the IF as a funding mechanism for highly innovative technologies on  
the EU level. With the IF, it is extended to a large a set of sectors and technologies, thereby providing a good 
data base for applying a similar methodology in the context of Article 6.4. However, the focus of the approach 
on additional costs with regard to a reference case might also entail a risk of discontinuation in some cases. 
Therefore, the mechanism design has to ensure that appropriate measures to counteract discontinuation are 
established in order to support the long-term orientation of emission reductions.
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The EU Taxonomy is designed as a tool to increase common understanding among investors, companies, 
issuers, and political representatives whether an economic activity is environmentally sustainable or “green”. 
This way investment is supposed to be channeled to have the most impact on sustainable development. The 
taxonomy also emphasizes the net-zero objective by selecting activities that would substantially contribute to 
climate mitigation and considers the concurrent development of other sustainable development goals. Once the 
taxonomy regulation is legislatively implemented, future “green” investments will need to be accompanied by 
an explanation on how the taxonomy criteria were applied. Established or emerging financial instruments will 
have to adapt to the proposed taxonomy. By setting ambitious thresholds for what is a substantial contribution, 
the establishing the economy has a potential to considerably enhance climate mitigation action. 
However, the EU taxonomy tries to cover a wide range of economic activities and therefore the current outline of 
activities in the taxonomy is extensive. The challenge of the taxonomy is that it needs to find a balance between 
defining eligible activities by the criteria provided above, and not to be too restrictive in the promotion of green 
investments. Furthermore, for the taxonomy to be successful it is necessary to ensure that it is dynamic and inte-
grates all new advancements in green technologies.
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3 Conclusions
The new mechanism defined under Article 6.4 of the PA is supposed to allow for international cooperation with 
regard to climate change mitigation and thereby enable an increase in overall mitigation. This means that all 
activities eligible under Article 6.4 need to demonstrate additionality with regard to the NDCs of the countries 
involved, which is challenging given the continuous increase of ambition of NDCs. Nevertheless, the design of 
the mechanism under Article 6.4 should also make sure that it is in line with other objectives of the PA. In 
particular, one of the central objectives of the PA is to reach global net-zero GHG emissions in the second half  
of the 21st century. So the activities under Article 6.4 should at least not be in conflict with this objective but 
even better foster national pathways leading to net-zero GHG emission. Building this into the mechanism 
requires to shift the focus from short- and mid-term considerations to the long-term perspective in one way  
or another. In the optimal case, this is part of designing the rulebook for Article 6 or CMA rules, but could 
alternatively be fostered through action by individual host and acquiring countries. Setting the focus on long-
term emission reduction strategies is necessary, in particular, for avoiding technological lock-ins that would 
hinder a full decarbonisation in the long run. 
This discussion paper has explored three different approaches that may help to foster the long-term objective  
of net-zero GHG emissions in the operationalization of Article 6.4, namely:
▸	 Positive and negative lists: Positive and negative lists may be a simple tool to, on the one hand, enable 
easier eligibility of certain activity types known to be compatible, and, on the one hand, classify certain 
activity types that are very likely to be incompatible with the long-term objective as ineligible. Nevertheless, 
there remain certain activity types, for which a more detailed consideration is necessary. Therefore,  
a three-tiered approach reflecting these three groups of activity types has been identified to be most  
compelling here. This approach mirrors similar approaches applied to the alignment of investments  
with the objectives of the PA, classifying them as Paris-aligned, misaligned or conditional.
▸	 Additionality with regard to a baseline consistent with both, NDCs and long-term targets: The use  
of baselines to demonstrate additionality with regard to NDCs will only foster net-zero emissions in case  
of an ambitious NDC and even then may partially entail lock-in of GHG emissions the long-term perspective. 
To tackle the net-zero objective, the baselines need to incorporate long-term targets as well. This long-term 
perspective can be based on a detailed national pathway to net-zero emissions, e. g. taking into account a 
country’s LT-LEDS, or on science-based targets independent of the detailed situation in the country. As both 
approaches have advantages and disadvantages, it seems most promising to combine them in a way such 
that science-based targets guarantee the required level of ambition, while compatibility with the country’s 
LT-LEDS is also ensured.
▸	 Adaptation of existing instruments and criteria: The net-zero objective is also relevant for some existing 
funding instruments linked to both carbon markets and climate finance. The World Bank’s TCAF applies  
the concept of transformational change to address the long-term perspective of the programs funded by  
the TCAF. While the concepts has some links to the use of baselines and positive lists, it adds some softer 
criteria about the long-term impact, in particular about the avoidance of discontinuation due to finance and/
or acceptance issues. While the EU Taxonomy defines threshold criteria with regard to sustainability for a 
broad set of technology fields, the EU’s Innovation Fund focuses on support for technologies that are needed 
for net-zero emissions but are often not part of mitigation pathways due to being highly innovative. The costs 
eligible for funding under the IF are calculated with regard to a reference technology. This concept might be 
transferred to the mechanism under Article 6.4 to split both the avoided emissions and the relevant costs 
between a reference mitigation technology and an innovative one to be traded via the mechanism. Moreover, 
the project types expected under the IF and the EU Taxonomy may serve as an input to the compilation of 
positive lists for Article 6.4.
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The detailed discussion of the approaches has shown that the approaches should not be seen as mutually 
exclusive but rather as complementary to each other. In addition, although they are at least partially addressing 
additionality as well, they cannot be a full replacement for checking additionality. Working with baselines 
instead of positive/ negative lists has the benefit that there is no need to explicitly “pick technologies”. On the 
other hand, developing baselines in line with long term zero emissions may be cumbersome, if not science 
based target approach is used. Another important observation is that there is not much information on the 
AFOLU sector yet, which may play a key role for fostering net-zero GHG emissions. From the analyses in this 
report, two storylines emerge how to combine aspects of the different approaches in a reasonable way to foster 
the long-term objective of net-zero GHG emissions under Article 6.4:
▸	 If politically feasible, the most straight-forward approach would be to use the three-tiered approach corres-
ponding to negative and positive lists in the first step. This means to sort out certain activity types in the 
beginning by establishing positive and negative lists, while the eligibility of activity types that are neither on 
the positive list nor on the negative list will be conditional to the application of further criteria. The positive 
list could make use of the list of project types expected under the IF and the EU Taxonomy. In the next step, 
the remaining activity types would be assessed based on comparison with a baseline that should demons-
trate both additionality and compatibility with a long-term mitigation pathway in line with the net-zero 
objective. In a third step, buyers with particular high standards could in addition apply further relevant 
criteria of transformational change, thereby reducing the risk of discontinuation and supporting a sustain-
able transition of the host country. 
▸	 However, as has been argued in Section 2.2.2, positive and negative lists will face high political barriers and 
are also in danger of experiencing strong influence from lobbying organisations. Therefore, such kind of lists 
are more likely to be established as buying criteria by individual buyers. In this case, they would be still 
complementary to the other approaches but the ordering would be changed. In this case, the starting point 
would be the inclusion of baselines compatible with the long-term targets in the proof of additionality, 
thereby excluding activities with only short-term effects in addition to NDCs and/or activities becoming the 
reference case in the longer term. The split of avoided emissions and relevant costs between the activities 
and reference cases could follow the methodology of the IF, at least for those project types covered by the  
IF as well. Nevertheless, some of the remaining eligible activities may still be seen to be not in line with the 
long-term objective or contradict the requirements of transformation change. Then, individual buyers could 
classify these based on positive and negative list, but also apply additional criteria for policy and financial 
sustainability to foster a transformational change.
Looking ahead, it will probably be rather difficult to establish mechanisms that foster the long-term objective  
of net-zero GHG emissions in the operationalisation of Article 6.4, at least in the short term because the Article 6 
negotiations are currently highly contentious even without consideration of the long-term aspects discussed 
here. In particular, the long-term aspects would pose an additional burden for a transfer of the existing mecha-
nisms to the new context. Nevertheless, there is the need to at least have a clear roadmap of how to achieve 
compliance of the mechanism with the net-zero objective in the longer term. The options discussed here provide 
some potential avenues. Given the unclear political feasibility of each of the approaches, it seems important not 
to stick to one approach only, but to be flexible in establishing any of it, whenever a window of opportunity 
turns up. In this context, for higher ambitious an implementation under a club approach by a group of countries 
seems more feasible as the first step, while taking into account that robust rules to assure environmental 
integrity must apply to all participants of the mechanism. 
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